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Essay 
Institutional Change and the Continuity of Law 
PETER L. LINDSETH 
This contribution offers reflections on Richard Kay’s theoretical and 
historical scholarship regarding processes of institutional (and, by extension, 
constitutional) change. The focus here is on Kay’s 2014 legal-historical 
monograph, The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law. Kay’s analysis 
draws theoretical inspiration primarily (though hardly exclusively) from an 
Anglo-American tradition, based particularly on the work of H. L. A. Hart. This 
Essay argues that Kay’s Hartian approach ultimately depends on a somewhat 
strained distinction between law and non-law in processes of change that does not 
map well onto the historical record that Kay otherwise cogently analyzes. Kay is 
forced, therefore, to supplement his Hartian framework with a distinction between 
the “axiological” underpinnings of a revolution (be they social, political, or 
cultural) and its “legal” manifestation, i.e., the replacement of an old rule of 
recognition with a new one. In doing so, Kay’s analysis begins to point toward 
more complex dynamics of change that this Essay argues are more robustly 
captured by an alternative theoretical framework drawn from a more French 
tradition. Kay’s analysis resonates in particular with the institutional theory of 
Maurice Hauriou, who was also among the greatest administrative law scholars in 
France over the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. This Essay explores 
how Hauriou’s institutional theory could reinforce Kay’s work in this area, using 
the example of Kay’s seminal 2011 article, Constituent Authority, to demonstrate 
the potential connections. The Essay then returns to Kay’s analysis of the Glorious 
Revolution, arguing that the effort of its protagonists to retain the language of law 
and to operate within its forms was arguably a vindication of Hauriou’s central 
insight about the crucial role of law in allowing revolutionary change to achieve 










INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1475 
I. LEGAL RHETORIC, AXIOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS, AND 
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE ....................................................... 1479 
II. HAURIOU’S INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY AND THE DIMENSIONS 
OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE ....................................... 1483 
III. WHITHER “LAW”? ......................................................................... 1490 










Institutional Change and the Continuity of Law 
PETER L. LINDSETH * 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a great pleasure, along with so many distinguished scholars, to 
have this opportunity to contribute to a special issue in honor of our very 
own Rick Kay. Our focus, of course, is on Rick’s scholarship, and I will 
turn to that topic in a moment. At the outset, however, I would be remiss 
not to note how grateful we all are at UConn School of Law for Rick’s 
many contributions to our scholarly community over nearly a half-century. 
In my own case, as a younger academic trying to break into law teaching, I 
was fortunate to have Rick as my “shepherd” during my call-back on 
campus two decades ago. His careful handling of me on that fateful day, I 
like to think, helped pave the way for me eventually joining this faculty, 
and for that reason alone I owe him a special debt of gratitude. Rick, 
however, has been a “shepherd” to so many of us, not merely at UConn but 
also in the broader world of comparative law.1 He has been a model of 
academic citizenship and a source of wise counsel over many decades. It is 
thus altogether fitting and proper that the Connecticut Law Review should 
open its pages to this most well-deserved Festschrift, as a sign of our 
collective sense of appreciation and thanks. 
Rick’s scholarly achievements are many and varied, but I would like to 
focus here on his contributions to the field of comparative public law, and 
more particularly to the theoretical dimension of that field. In principle, 
Rick and I both specialize in comparative public law, he as a leader in its 
now flourishing constitutional branch, and I in its newer and perhaps less 
studied administrative off-shoot. But in many ways the two subfields are 
quite distinct, at least in terms of who populates them and the literature 
each group produces. In this sense, comparative constitutional and 
administrative law are built on different “epistemic communities,” as 
                                                                                                                     
* Olimpiad S. Ioffe Professor of International and Comparative Law; Director of International 
Programs; Co-Director, Program in Corporate and Regulatory Compliance, University of Connecticut 
School of Law. I would like to thank Yaniv Roznai for organizing this Festschrift and inviting me to 
take part. Thanks also go to Maxwell Berteletti, currently a third-year student at UConn School of Law, 
for his able research assistance. 
1 His leadership in the field is most tangibly reflected in his current role as President of the 
American Society of Comparative Law. ASCL Executive Board, AM. SOC’Y COMP. L., 
https://ascl.org/about/officers/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
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international-relations theorists might put it.2 Rick and I have no doubt 
overlapped loosely in the study of certain aspects of European integration,3 
and we have also had the chance to share manuscripts from time to time 
and also cite each other on occasion.4 But, given the distinctly different 
sets of interlocutors that make up our two respective subfields, we have 
probably not engaged with each other’s work as directly or as deeply as we 
might have liked (or at least that is certainly true in my case).  
This is unfortunate for one simple reason: Upon closer inspection, it is 
clear that Rick and I share a common interest in certain threshold 
theoretical questions. The most important of these, I would submit, relate 
to how governing institutions (and by extension, constitutions) are founded 
and change over time, as well as how law and legal rhetoric impact those 
processes.  
In approaching these questions, Rick draws his theoretical inspiration 
primarily (though hardly exclusively)5 from an Anglo-American tradition, 
based particularly on the work of H. L. A. Hart.6 My theoretical 
inspiration, on the other hand, comes from a more French tradition, 
drawing primarily from the work of Maurice Hauriou.7 Because so little of 
Hauriou’s thinking has found its way into English (apart from old 
translations of excerpts and slivers here and there),8 his work has received 
relatively little attention in scholarly discussions in the English-speaking 
                                                                                                                     
2 See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT’L. ORG. 1 (1992). 
3 See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, RICHARD S. KAY & ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2008); PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: 
RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE NATION-STATE (2010). 
4 See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 752 n.198 (2011) 
(citing LINDSETH, supra note 3); Peter L. Lindseth, The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism, 
22 EUR. L.J. 696, 708 n.42 (2016) (citing Kay, supra, at 716). 
5 One need only read, for example, the range of authors on which Rick draws in Constituent 
Authority, supra note 4, to gain the full breadth of his theoretical influences. 
6 See Richard S. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 188 & n.4 (1981) 
(explaining Hart’s constitutional theory and opining that it is “powerful and enlightening”); see also 
Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Change and Wade’s Ultimate Political Fact, 35 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 
31, 37 (2016) (explaining Hart’s analysis of the “rule of recognition”); Richard S. Kay, Legal Rhetoric 
and Revolutionary Change, 7 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 161, 181–82 & n.45 (1997) (citing H. L. A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–91, 116–23 (2d ed. 1994) in analyzing the Southern secession crisis 
preceding the U.S. Civil War). 
7 See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Between the ‘Real’ and the ‘Right’: Explorations Along the 
Institutional-Constitutional Frontier, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: BRIDGING 
IDEALISM AND REALISM 60, 62–64 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017) (citing Hauriou’s theories as the 
“starting point” for understanding institutional change). Portions of this Essay draw on this book 
chapter. 
8 See, e.g., THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS: MAURICE HAURIOU, GEORGES RENARD, JOSEPH T. 
DELOS (Albert Broderick ed., Mary Welling trans., 1970) (containing English translations of several 
works by Hauriou) [hereinafter THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS]. More recently, see MAURICE 
HAURIOU, TRADITION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (Christopher Berry Gray trans., 2011) (translating MAURICE 
HAURIOU, LA SCIENCE SOCIALE TRADITIONNELLE (1896)). 
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world. That too is unfortunate, and not just because Hauriou was among 
the greatest administrative law scholars of the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries. Rather, more importantly for our purposes, 
Hauriou was also the progenitor of what he called the “theory of the 
institution and the foundation.”9 Perhaps better than any other theorist, 
Hauriou understood how the transformation of “the real into the right” 
served as the very foundation of public law, whether administrative or 
constitutional.10 Rick and I are both fascinated by these sorts of liminal 
situations between real and right, in which social facts—economic, 
political, cultural, historical, ideological—are somehow transformed into 
authoritative law for a particular community. Such a transformation, of 
course, can be understood as giving rise to a new “rule of recognition” in a 
Hartian sense (Rick’s view), or to a new “institution” as Hauriou would 
have put it (my view). In either case, out of that transformation can come a 
particular and fundamental kind of “right”—ultimately a “constitution”—
for a particular political community. Each of us puzzle over what precisely 
this means, both in socio-historical and legal terms.11 
Part I of this Essay explores Rick’s approach to this question by 
looking at his understanding of the relationship of law to processes of 
revolutionary change. The primary vehicle for this opening discussion is an 
examination of the theoretical dimension of Rick’s recent and fascinating 
2014 legal-historical monograph, The Glorious Revolution and the 
Continuity of Law (hereinafter GRCL).12 The discussion further explores 
how, in approaching the question of law and revolutionary change, Rick 
struggles to remain faithful to his Hartian framework. The problem is that 
this framework ultimately depends on a distinction between the interior 
and exterior of the legal system that does not map well onto his historical 
evidence. Thus, as a supplement to his Hartian framework, Rick introduces 
the distinction between the “axiological” underpinnings of a revolution (be 
they social, political, or cultural) and its “legal” manifestation, i.e., the 
replacement of an old rule of recognition with a new one. In doing so, 
Rick’s analysis begins to point us toward more complex dynamics in 
processes of revolutionary change that I would argue are more robustly 
captured by Hauriou’s theory of the institution. 
                                                                                                                     
9 Maurice Hauriou, The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social Vitalism, 
in THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS, supra note 8, at 93. 
10 Maurice Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, 31 HARV. L. REV. 813, 
815 (1918). 
11 Compare Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 715 (“What makes a constitution a 
constitution?”), with Peter Lindseth, The Metabolic Constitution and the Limits of EU Legal Pluralism, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LEGAL PLURALISM IN EU LAW 223 (Gareth Davies & Matej Avbelj eds., 
2018) (“What does it mean for power to be ‘constituted’? What are the normative or practical 
implications of this ‘constitutional’ phenomenon?”). 
12 RICHARD S. KAY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW (2014). 
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Part II then explores Hauriou’s theory in more detail, drawing linkages 
between it and Rick’s work. The discussion begins, however, not with 
Hauriou but with Rick’s seminal 2011 article, Constituent Authority.13 In 
that piece, Rick confronts squarely the question whether “successful 
constitution-making must involve something more than the expression 
of will”14—again one of those liminal situations at the boundary between 
law’s seeming interior and exterior. As Part II will show, consistent with 
Rick’s position in Constituent Authority, Hauriou also finds it implausible 
that “constituted law” is merely a matter of will, force, or power—or, as 
Hauriou once put it, “an attack that has succeeded.”15 All institutions, 
Hauriou theorized, begin with some kind of exercise of will. But thereafter, 
he posited, they must “put [themselves] in harmony with the conscience of 
jurisprudence,”16 thus suggesting that exercises of power and law are 
inextricably intertwined. Part II builds on Hauriou’s approach to advance a 
theory of institutional (and by extension constitutional) change across three 
dimensions—functional, political, and cultural—whose complex 
interaction, as well as potential reconciliation, help us better understand the 
foundations of stable social, political, and legal order over time. 
This Essay then concludes, in Part III, by returning to the role of law in 
this overarching process. Despite Rick’s intense focus on law in his work, 
he is surprisingly ambivalent about its role. As he describes in the 
introduction to GRCL—somewhat jarringly—the English revolutionaries 
of 1688-89 “crammed irregular decisions into the regular forms; they 
described illegal actions with legal terminology. In short, they faked it.”17 
One might take this as an expression of a deep (perhaps even 
overwhelming) skepticism toward the purported “continuity of law” at the 
heart of the account advanced in GRCL. Was it really a “fake” continuity 
after all, given that, consistent with a Hartian framing, it ultimately entailed 
the replacement of the prevailing rule of recognition? If so, then perhaps 
GRCL is misleadingly titled. Perhaps it is really an account of legal 
rupture, as well as about the manner in which legal-sounding rhetoric can, 
in the right circumstances, be used to mask that rupture, to create a sense of 
comforting continuity where little or none in fact exists. Part III argues, 
however, that it is precisely the effort to retain the language of law and to 
operate within its forms that differentiates the change wrought by the 
Glorious Revolution from other political transformations that ultimately 
proved more fragile. This, I would suggest, is a vindication of both of 
Rick’s title as well as Hauriou’s central insight about the crucial role of 
                                                                                                                     
13 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 721–22. 
14 Id. at 721.  
15 Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, supra note 10, at 816. 
16 Id. 
17 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 17. 
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law in allowing revolutionary change to achieve legitimacy and durable 
institutionalization over time.  
I. LEGAL RHETORIC, AXIOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS, AND 
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 
In GRCL, Rick focuses on what he sees as “the distortion of legal 
concepts” inherent in a process of revolutionary change, as well as how 
those distortions can “influence[] the actions, the institutions, and the 
rhetoric of the new settlement.”18 In doing so, Rick is in fact returning to a 
topic that he had first explored nearly two decades previously, in a 1997 
article aptly entitled Legal Rhetoric and Revolutionary Change.19  
In that earlier piece, Rick had placed the English revolutionaries of 
1688-89 at one end of an analytical spectrum, as self-perceived agents of a 
deeper legality against the asserted illegality of the government they sought 
to overthrow.20 In such a “legalist revolution,” as Rick would later put it,21 
it was only natural for the protagonists “to connect their actions . . . to the 
artifacts of the legal system they [were] displacing.”22 At the opposite end 
of Rick’s analytical spectrum were, quite fittingly, the Bolshevik 
revolutionaries in 1917 Russia, who saw themselves as agents of a 
thoroughgoing rejection and transcendence of the old regime.23 As a 
consequence, much less than justifying their actions in terms of an older 
legality, the Bolsheviks felt themselves free to construct—indeed 
historically compelled to construct, according to their ideology—an 
entirely new governing system based on a revolutionary conception of law 
and public order at its core.24 
What, according to Rick, ultimately differentiated the English 
revolutionaries of 1688-89 from their Bolshevik counterparts in 1917? 
Perhaps less than one might suppose, at least from the ultimate perspective 
of law. Despite the hyper-legalist rhetoric of the Glorious Revolution, the 
English insurrectionists still engaged in what was, in Rick’s estimation, 
fundamentally an extra-legal enterprise. This is entirely in keeping with 
Rick’s ultimately Hartian understanding of the foundations of 
revolutionary change. For Rick, such change boils down to a “replacement 
of one rule of recognition with a distinctly new one.”25 To achieve that 
                                                                                                                     
18 Id. at 2. 
19 Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6. 
20 Id. at 166. 
21 Richard S. Kay, William III and the Legalist Revolution, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1645 (2000). 
22 Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS. 31, 46 (2000).  
23 Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 166. 
24 Id. at 205–06.  
25 Kay, Constitutional Change, supra note 6, at 37 (citing HART, supra note 6, at 117–23, 153; 
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12; Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6). 
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goal, however, “mere legal authority would be insufficient even though 
such changes might be articulated using the rhetoric of law.”26 Because the 
replacement of a rule of recognition goes to the very heart of “some settled 
source of legal authority,” the replacement could only be effectuated “from 
a point of view external to the legal system . . . based on political history 
and morality.”27 
In short, from this Hartian perspective, both the English revolutionaries 
of 1688-89 and their Bolshevik counterparts in 1917 were engaged in an 
ultimately extra-legal insurrection. What differentiated them, rather, was 
what Rick would call the prevailing “axiological” environment in which 
they operated, i.e., the well of values and experiences—cultural, historical, 
social, political—from which they drew, which in turn impelled them 
toward revolutionary change.28 In seventeenth-century England, adherence 
to law (or the appearance thereof) provided an independent source of 
axiological value from which otherwise extra-legal revolutionary impulses 
might be dressed up and thereby gain political-cultural traction. In the case 
of late-seventeenth century England, “the need to accommodate the law 
was not a mere irritant. It was a powerful constraint on what the 
revolutionaries did and, certainly, on what they said. The pull of legality 
and the shame of illegality were continuous, insistent, and intense.”29 
(Precisely because the English revolutionaries felt the need to avoid any 
appearance of being lawless, they needed to “fake[] it,” as Rick puts it.)30 
By contrast, the Bolsheviks in 1917 felt no similar need for this sort of 
legal subterfuge, because the axiological environment in which they 
operated gave them license to do so. This was so not just because of the 
Bolsheviks’ own utterly rejectionist ideology toward “bourgeois” legality 
and the state. Rather, it was also because of the thin—indeed, arguably 
non-existent—culture of legality of the Tsarist regime they were seeking to 
overthrow.31  
To get a better handle on Rick’s understanding of how this sort of 
axiological background might influence revolutionary episodes, we can 
turn to the opening pages of GRCL, which provide further theoretical 
elaboration. As Rick explains there, a revolutionary change in regime—
                                                                                                                     
26 Id. 
27 Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 182 (citing HART, supra note 6, at 89–91, 116–23; Kay, 
Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 6). 
28 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 17–20 (following Jerzy Wróblewski, The 
Analytical Concept of Revolution, in ENLIGHTENMENT, RIGHTS AND REVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 374 (Neil MacCormick & Zenon Bankowski eds., 1989)).  
29 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 2.  
30 Id. at 17. 
31 Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 203–08. 
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legal, political, or otherwise—always requires an antecedent axiological 
shift.32 He explains: 
The formal rules and institutions of any state are created and 
maintained in response to certain substantive social needs. 
The stability of formal arrangements will depend on how 
well they continue to fit the substantive desiderata. But the 
latter derive from social facts and values that are subject to 
inevitable change. As they change, the suitability of existing 
legal structures may diminish. Sooner or later, that is, 
constitutional rules are likely to chafe and the preconditions 
for revolution will be in place.33 
As Rick further notes, however, there are two factors complicating this 
seeming congruence between the axiological and legal/constitutional 
manifestations of revolution. The first flows from the fact that, 
[i]f constitutions responded perfectly and instantly to altered 
social conditions and political convictions, the axiological 
and legal marks of revolution would appear simultaneously. 
But that is almost never the case. Typically, there will be a 
lag during which time the underlying social and political 
values remain unsettled while the old constitutional 
institutions remain in place.34  
This idea of “lag” is in fact well known to theorists of institutional 
change. In modern parlance, such lags reflect institutional “stickiness”;35 
that is, the remarkable resilience of certain socio-political or socio-legal 
arrangements in the face of pressures for change. Pierre Bourdieu, the 
French sociologist, called this phenomenon “hysteresis,”36 drawing the 
concept from the natural sciences, where it is used to describe dynamic 
systems whose outputs are time-dependent on present and past inputs.37 
When we apply this idea to the social and political world, it helps us better 
understand the relative rarity of outright revolution. For such radical 
transformations to occur, there normally needs to be a “critical juncture,” 
                                                                                                                     
32 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 19 (“The legal revolution . . . must—sooner or 
later—follow the axiological one.”).  
33 Id. at 18 (citing Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 22, at 46). 
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, Institutional Stickiness and 
the New Development Economics, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 331, 332 (2008) (discussing how certain 
institutional arrangements tend to get “lock[ed] in”). 
36 See Cheryl Hardy, Hysteresis, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS 132–34 (Michael Grenfell 
ed., 2008) (defining the concept of “hysteresis”). 
37 The concept now has a wide range of applications across several scientific fields (notably 
physics) as well as engineering and economics. See generally MARK A. KRASNOSEL’SKII & ALEKSEI V. 
POKROVSKII, SYSTEMS WITH HYSTERESIS (Marek Niezgódka trans., 1989). 
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as the literature puts it;38 that is, “a rare confluence of functional, political, 
and cultural shifts that radically undermine existing institutional 
settlements,” which then help to overcome hysteresis “and thereby open[] 
the way for genuinely new institutional configurations.”39 
As Rick further suggests, however, there is a second potential factor 
that, in his view, can complicate the congruence between the axiological 
and legal manifestations of revolution. This one flows from the fact that 
“legal regularity may itself comprise a significant social-political value” in 
certain contexts.40 This adds a twist to Rick’s insistence, following Hart, 
that revolutionary change must be effectuated “from a point of view 
external to the legal system . . . based on political history and morality.”41 
How can the commitment to legal regularity operate in this extra-legal 
sense? Rick fully acknowledges this problem:  
The awkwardness of any legal revolution in such 
circumstances will be apparent. The new system will have to 
commend itself to the society, in part, by embracing the value 
of fidelity to law. Yet, by definition, it will itself be a breach 
of law. Such a revolution subverts its legitimacy by its own 
example.42  
This awkwardness for Rick summarizes the peculiar character of the 
Glorious Revolution: In order “to reconcile those axiological imperatives 
with the irresistible culture of legal propriety,”43 the revolutionaries of 
late-seventeenth century England needed “to employ the rhetoric, if not the 
reality, of legal regularity.”44 This is a somewhat peculiar argument, 
depending as it does on a strained, ultimately Hartian distinction between 
law and non-law that does not map very well onto the historical record 
presented in GRCL or indeed elsewhere. Not only are the realms of law 
and non-law not so clearly distinct in revolutionary moments, they are also 
deeply interdependent and permeable at all times. Thus, despite his formal 
Hartian framing, I would say that Rick is substantively on the right track 
when he seeks to understand revolutionary change in terms of a 
“reconcil[iation]” between the axiological and the legal45 (or, as my 
Hauriou-inflected approach would put it, between the socio-political “real” 
                                                                                                                     
38 Giovanni Capoccia, Critical Junctures and Institutional Change, in ADVANCES IN 
COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 147–48 (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2015). 
39 Lindseth, Between the ‘Real’ and the ‘Right’, supra note 7, at 73–74. 
40 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 19. 
41 Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 182 (citing HART, supra note 6, at 89–91, 116–23; Kay, 
Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 6). 
42 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 19. 
43 Id. at 20. 
44 Id. at 19. 
45 Id. 
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and the legal-normative “right”).46 Nonetheless, we are left to wonder 
whether recourse to a different analytical framework might better allow us 
to capture the complex dynamic processes that such reconciliation actually 
entails. 
II. HAURIOU’S INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY AND THE DIMENSIONS OF 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
To understand how Hauriou’s approach might usefully inform Rick’s 
own, we should turn first to Rick’s article Constituent Authority,47 and 
examine some of its theoretical implications in more detail. In this piece, 
Rick offers a critique of the traditional concept used to identify the 
law-maker behind a constitution—“constituent power”—whose drawbacks 
compel Rick to offer an alternative concept—“constituent authority”—in 
order to capture better what he sees as the realities of the 
constitution-making process.48 The entire analysis in Constituent Authority 
reflects a profound discomfort with the idea of constituent power as merely 
a “raw force, physical, psychological and emotional,”49 referring to a 
phenomenon seemingly external to law par excellence. Although the 
intellectual sources for this idea are many, Rick often invokes Carl Schmitt 
as its most articulate exponent. Rick quotes Schmitt, for example, for the 
proposition that the will of the “constitution-making power is existentially 
present: its power or authority lies in its being.”50 For Rick, “[t]his cannot 
be the whole story.”51 As he elaborates in a crucial passage: 
There is always a reason why an attempted assertion of 
power is effective. Rules might, for some time, prevail solely 
because of the physical might the rule-maker can bring to 
bear on the addressees of its rules. But for a successful 
constitution to endure for an extended period, there must be 
something about it that persuades (or at least permits) its 
subjects to submit to it . . . . In the case of a constitution, it 
will be essential that there exists an explicit or implicit 
determination by some significant part of the population that 
the makers of the constitution are or were an appropriate 
source of constitutional rules. I use the term “authority” to 
underline the fact that successful constitution-making must 
                                                                                                                     
46 Cf. Lindseth, Between the ‘Real’ and the ‘Right’, supra note 7, at 60–63 (describing a 
Hauriou-inspired approach for analyzing the “real” and the “right”). 
47 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4. 
48 Id. at 717–22 (drawing a distinction between “constituent power” and “constituent authority”). 
49 Id. at 719. 
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involve something more than the expression of will. It calls 
for the “augmentation and confirmation of will by some sort 
of reasoning.”52 
There are evident traces in this passage of Rick’s emphasis on the 
axiological context as a predicate to legal change that we discussed in Part 
I. But Rick adds here a skepticism of power and will as adequate in 
themselves, within the axiological realm, to precipitate durable and 
legitimate constitution-making. For the “reality” of power to effectively 
bring about a new realm of “right” expressed in a constitution, there must 
be a socio-historical and socio-political identity and legitimacy between 
the community and the purported makers of the constitution. There must, 
in other words, be a normative and legitimating foundation in the 
axiological context. Indeed, this antecedent normative basis to the 
transformation of “real” into “right” is reflected directly in the very next 
passage in Constituent Authority:  
Authority involves an evaluation of the rightness of the 
constituent events . . . . This does not make its existence any 
less a fact but it is a certain kind of fact, one that includes the 
collective critical judgments of some number of individuals 
in certain times and places. It is this continuing normative 
attitude that distinguishes constituent authority from simple 
constituent power.53 
These passages provide the basis to demonstrate the overlap between 
Rick’s position and Hauriou’s approach, which, as I hope to show in the 
subsequent discussion, is in fact profound. Hauriou was similarly critical of 
the view (which he associated with “German jurisprudence”) that “equates 
law with force . . . . Force becomes law by success. Constituted law is an 
attack that has succeeded.”54 An extended quotation of Hauriou’s 
subsequent critique of this view is worthwhile: 
It is easier to protest against the cynicism of such an outlook 
than formally to refute it. At first sight history seems to prove 
it. In international conflict and political revolution brutal 
conquest has long been responsible for the forcible union of 
peoples, and insurrection has given rise to legitimate 
government . . . . [However,] [w]e have to analyze with 
exactness the events that have occurred. Around an 
organization of fact which the process of history has 
                                                                                                                     
52 Id. (quoting Carl J. Friedrich, Authority, Reason and Discretion, in AUTHORITY 28, 32 (Carl 
Friedrich ed., 1958)) (other citations omitted). 
53 Id. at 721–22. 
54 Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, supra note 10, at 816. 
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institutionalized and made legitimate we have in reality a 
succession of phenomena . . . . In the first phase an 
organization is created simply by force, and it then desires to 
live in peace. But to obtain a peaceful existence the new 
organization must obtain pardon for its origin, must modify 
itself, must put itself in harmony with the conscience of 
jurisprudence. Peaceful existence is possible only when the 
demands of law are satisfied. Until that is achieved the 
usurper must maintain an armed peace, and an armed peace 
is not a peaceful existence. So any organization derived from 
force becomes neither institutionalized nor legitimate save 
when law has beatified it. Nor does law beatify by reason of 
force alone.55  
As suggested by this passage, Hauriou discerned an intimate linkage 
between institutionalization and the emergence of legitimacy and law. But 
the relationship, as I hope to show, is always recursive and reflexive, each 
operating on each other in complex ways. Indeed, one might argue that, 
while Hauriou viewed constituted law as the culmination of the process, 
law itself was inextricably tied to—and ultimately inseparable from—
antecedent processes of institutionalization and the emergence of 
legitimacy. Only with all three could “an organization of fact . . . obtain a 
peaceful existence.”56  
I will outline the particular elements of Hauriou’s theory of the 
institution in a moment.57 But allow me to stress first that, among its many 
other virtues, Hauriou stressed that it could provide, inter alia, “a 
satisfactory explanation of the difficult problem of legitimacy arising from 
prescription.”58 “In law, as in history,” he wrote in his 1925 definitive 
summation of his theory, “institutions stand for duration, continuity, and 
reality; the process of their foundation constitutes the juridical basis of 
society and the state.”59 The process involved, Hauriou maintained, a 
                                                                                                                     
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
58 Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, supra note 10, at 816. 
59 Hauriou, The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation, supra note 9, at 93. Hauriou 
distinguished between two types of institutions, both relevant for our purposes: “institution-persons” 
and “institution-things.” The former refer to social bodies like states, corporations, guilds, associations, 
etc., that have come to have legal personality of their own. In this category states hold a unique place, 
however, in that only states possess the autonomous capacity to mobilize resources in their own right in 
a legitimate and compulsory manner (other social bodies, like corporations or guilds, also require 
mobilization of resources from their members but ultimately depend on the state to enforce that 
capacity, often through mechanisms of private law, such as contract). Consequently, for most social 
bodies short of the state, their character is dependent on what Hauriou called institution-things, or the 
juridical rules existing within society, such as property and contract, which borrow the power of 
sanction from the state as the ultimate social body in the collectivity. Id. at 99–100 (emphasis added). 
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complex interaction between “objective” social, political, and historical 
forces—what Rick might call the “axiological” context—and “subjective” 
exercises of will in pursuance of particular ideas about that context more 
broadly. As Hauriou wrote, “the social milieu has only a force of inertia 
that finds expression in either a power of reinforcement of individual 
proposals when it approves them, or a power of opposition and reaction 
when it disapproves them; but of itself it has neither initiative nor power of 
creation.”60 For Hauriou, subjective will, motivated by an idea, creates 
change when it interacts with those “objective” social, political, and 
historical forces.  
At the most abstract level, the process of institutionalization, as 
Hauriou understood it, involved three elements: “(1) the idea of the work 
or enterprise to be realized in a social group; (2) the organized power put at 
service of this idea for its realization; (3) the manifestations of communion 
that occur within the social group with respect to the idea and its 
realization.”61 I would restate the elements of institutionalization in slightly 
different terms,62 viewing them instead as sets of variables whose 
coordinates, if you will, can be described along three inter-related 
dimensions: 
• the functional, in which actors seek to respond to 
objective demands (‘needs’) presented by their natural or 
social environment, subject to functional constraints on 
available resources, whether inherent in the human 
species or environmental, cultural, or technological;  
• the political, in which actors, while responding to these 
functional needs/constraints, struggle over the allocation 
of scarce institutional advantages within their collectivity 
or beyond, either as to the existing institutional 
advantages they seek to preserve or the new ones they 
seek to realize;  
• and finally, the cultural, or the realm in which actors 
mobilize competing notions of legitimacy (conceptions 
of ‘right’), often religiously or legally expressed, either 
to justify or to resist changes in institutional and legal 
categories/structures in their response to functional 
needs/constraints. 
                                                                                                                     
60 Id. at 97. 
61 Id. at 100–01. 
62 The reasoning behind this revised approach is set out in greater detail in: Lindseth, Between the 
‘Real’ and the ‘Right’, supra note 7, at 63–70. 
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The complexity of the interplay between these various dimensions is a 
principal reason why we observe a large degree of variation in institutional 
forms in human evolution—what Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, the 
leading institutional theorist of the past half-century, has called the great 
“diversity of regularized social behavior that we observe at multiple 
scales.”63 The three dimensions of institutional change—functional, 
political, and cultural—should always be understood as overlapping and 
interpenetrating, with varied and multidirectional causal relationships 
operating among them. As a leading comparative historian once rightly 
reminded us: “Where a historical problem is big enough to matter, 
causation is invariably multiple, the factors intertwined and 
interdependent.”64 How a particular society views social and economic 
(i.e., “axiological”) demands at any given moment, for example, will 
depend significantly on the cultural system of interpretation that is then 
dominant, as well as on how competing interests mobilize interpretative 
frameworks to serve their political goals. A functional concept like 
“[n]eed, to make the obvious point, is subjective, political, time-dependent, 
and cultural.”65 Moreover, a functional resource like property (or, indeed, 
legality)66 can also operate to define interests in the political dimension 
while also constituting an ideology in the cultural dimension.67 Finally, 
legitimacy—the seemingly quintessential cultural element of institutional 
change (as to both governing structures and legal rules)—can also be 
                                                                                                                     
63 ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 6 (2005). Like Ostrom, I seek 
to explain this institutional variation by reference to “a universal framework composed of nested sets of 
components within components for explaining human behavior.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). See 
Elinor Ostrom, Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, 39 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 7, 8 (2011) (“The study of institutions depends on theoretical work undertaken at three levels 
of specificity that are often confused with one another. These essential foundations are (i) frameworks, 
(ii) theories, and (iii) models.”). Further potential linkages between my (Hauriou-inspired) framework 
and Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework will need to be explored in 
greater detail in another venue. For present purposes, however, it is worth noting the cross-resonance 
and potential overlap between the three “external variables” that Ostrom identifies as foundational to 
her IAD framework—“biophysical conditions,” “attributes of community,” and “rules-in-use”—and the 
three dimensions (functional, political, and cultural) that I identify as fundamental to the process of 
institutional change. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of 
Complex Economic Systems, Prize Lecture for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University (Dec. 8, 2009), in THE NOBEL 
PRIZES 414–15 (Karl Grandin ed., 2009), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-
sciences/2009/ostrom/lecture/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
64 DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 200 
(1998). 
65 Id. at 199. 
66 Arguably, as Rick shows in GRCL, legality was such a resource upon which the English 
revolutionaries of 1688–89 needed to draw. See supra notes 29–30, 44 and accompanying text. 
67 See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 64, at 200 (referring to “accustomed rights of property” in the 
United States playing major roles as both “interests and ideology” in the reception of European models 
of social policy in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries). 
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understood as a functional resource that enables or constrains action in the 
political dimension.68 
Consequently, if we could truly isolate changes in the functional 
dimension from the political or cultural dimensions (which arguably we 
cannot), then perhaps we would observe much smoother evolutionary 
development in legal and political institutions. Instead, we find the 
notorious “stickiness,” which arguably results from the same complex 
interplay of functional, political, and cultural factors over time. Economic 
or social shifts in the functional dimension may, depending on the array of 
interests, trigger either support or resistance in the political dimension. 
Moreover, this functional/political interaction will be subject to varying 
and potentially contradictory interpretations mobilized in the cultural 
dimension. The line of causation will always be multidirectional, and there 
is no guarantee that new functional demands—or, for that matter, new 
arrays of political interests or even alternative conceptions of legitimacy 
that may emerge—will, in themselves, inevitably or inexorably lead to 
institutional change.  
Indeed, if there is a bias in the system, it is arguably in favor of gradual 
change in the intermediate term, which will generally occur within the 
confines of a more enduring institutional “settlement” rather than cause 
radical change leading to a new “settlement” itself. Of course, sometimes 
such radical change does occur, as Rick explores in GRCL. But the more 
important point is that, while historical actors are not prisoners of inherited 
models and systems of interpretations—they do retain agency69—their 
natural inclination has been to seek to understand (i.e., “to reconcile”)70 
corresponding shifts in structures of governance in terms of conceptions of 
legitimacy that are recognizable in historical and cultural, if still evolving, 
terms.71 This process of reconciliation inevitably acts as a drag on the 
process of institutional change, an example of Bourdieu’s “hysteresis” in 
action.72 
The bias against radical institutional change is particularly manifest in 
the constitutional domain, a core focus of Rick’s work. But to appreciate 
this bias fully, we must break from a narrow and positivistic conception of 
a constitution as “an identifiable text or set of texts containing rules at the 
                                                                                                                     
68 See, e.g., LINDSETH, supra note 3, at 11 (expanding on legitimacy’s role in institutional 
change). 
69 As the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins reminds us: “For if there is always a past in the present, 
an a priori system of interpretation, there is also a ‘life which desires itself’ (as Nietzsche says).” 
MARSHALL SAHLINS, ISLANDS OF HISTORY 152 (1985).  
70 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
71 Cf. Peter L. Lindseth, Reconciling with the Past: John Willis and the Question of Judicial 
Review in Inter-War and Post-War England, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 657 (2005); see also LINDSETH, 
supra note 3. 
72 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
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highest level of the formal legal hierarchy.”73 This is Rick’s claimed 
approach in Constituent Authority. It allows him, definitionally, to argue 
that a range of social and political factors are extra-legal and 
extra-constitutional, even as they are nonetheless essential to the ultimate 
legitimacy and durability of the constitutional system as a whole.74 The 
fact that they are so essential, however, suggests to me that we should not 
be using the term “constitutional” in the merely formal sense as an act of 
positive law. Rather, we should deploy it in the most robust and 
substantive sense, something with strong socio-historical, socio-cultural, 
and socio-political underpinnings within a particular community. 
Hauriou alluded to these underpinnings when he spoke of 
“constitutional superlegality”; that is, “a sort of constitutional legitimacy 
that occupies a place above even the written constitution.”75 Rick’s 
analysis effectively concurs, even if he insists, very much in a Hartian 
vein, that “constituent authority cannot be legal authority.”76 As his 
analysis in Constituent Authority shows, the transformation of an 
institutional arrangement into something genuinely “constitutional” for a 
particular community—that is, the creation of a body or bodies capable of 
ruling legitimately and durably on the community’s behalf—requires a 
special kind of transformation that inevitably entails a legal-cultural 
component.  
In the democratic age in which we (hopefully) still find ourselves, this 
process is intimately tied to the historical emergence of a sense that a 
particular political community, as a collectivity, is “entitled to effective 
organs of political self-government”77 through institutions that the 
community “constitutes” for this purpose. Crucial in this transition is 
collective historical memory, or the manner in which certain institutions 
are able to derive legitimacy from their popular association with the certain 
critical “moments” in the community’s past.78 This democratic and 
constitutional self-consciousness—what we often call the sense of being a 
“demos,” “people,” or “nation”—need not be grounded in exclusionary 
ethnic, racial, religious, or linguistic affinities, nor does it preclude 
                                                                                                                     
73 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 715. 
74 See, e.g., supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
75 Norbert Foulquier, Maurice Hauriou, Constitutionnaliste (1856-1929), 2 JUS POLITICUM 1, 12–
13 (2009) (quoting MAURICE HAURIOU, PRÉCIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 296 (1st ed. 1923) 
(Lindseth translation), hard-copy downloadable at http://juspoliticum.com/article/Maurice-Hauriou-
constitutionnaliste-1856-1929-75.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2020)).   
76 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 716. 
77 NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 173 (1999) (Oxford Univ. Press Inc. ed., 1999) (emphasis added). 
78 See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Law, History, and Memory: “Republican Moments” and the 
Legitimacy of Constitutional Review in France, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 54 (1997). See also, Kay, 
Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 742 (on the role of historical memory). Cf. Kay, Constitutional 
Chrononomy, supra note 22 (on time and constitution-making). 
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cooperation with other polities on the basis of reciprocity and 
interdependence. As Neil MacCormick has shown, this 
demos-consciousness can be “civic”—based in shared ideals—although it 
still must be grounded in a “historical” and indeed “cultural” experience 
for that particular community.79 
It should be noted that Rick expresses some skepticism about the 
possibility of “a purely demotic polity, one based solely on loyalty to 
shared civic values.”80 In our reading of that sentence, however, we must 
place emphasis on the words purely and solely. In GRCL, in fact, Rick’s 
entire argument is built around the idea that the prevailing “axiological” 
value system in late-seventeenth century England was informed, in 
significant part, by loyalty to at least one such civic value—adherence to 
law—which then deeply shaped the contours of the ensuing constitutional 
revolution.81 Although, as Rick suggests in Constituent Authority, it may 
well be impossible to “banish” from the act of constitution-making “the 
centrifugal tendency of distinct historical-cultural sympathies,”82 his 
account in GRCL suggests that values we now regard as “civic” may well 
be part of the “historical” and “cultural” experience for a particular 
community, precisely as MacCormick suggested. The only real question 
left opened by Rick’s account is not so much whether this value is part of 
the axiological context of the Glorious Revolution, but whether (oddly) it 
can also be understood as part of the system of “law” or understandings of 
“legality” through which the revolutionaries felt bound to pursue their 
goals. 
III. WHITHER “LAW”? 
This brings us back, in closing, to the jarring comment in the opening 
chapter of GRCL: that the English revolutionaries of 1688-89, per Rick, 
“crammed irregular decisions into the regular forms; they described illegal 
actions with legal terminology. In short, they faked it.”83 Or, as he puts it 
two pages later, they sought “to employ the rhetoric, if not the reality, of 
legal regularity” in bringing about a revolutionary change in regime.84 
Viewed from the broader institutionalist perspective outlined in Part II, 
Rick appears to be clinging here to an excessively literal understanding of 
law and legality in drawing his ultimate conclusions (which, it should be 
stressed, are otherwise deeply persuasive). This flows again from his 
                                                                                                                     
79 MACCORMICK, supra note 77, at 169–74. See also Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 
740–43. 
80 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 743. 
81 See supra notes 28–30, 44–46 and accompanying text. 
82 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 743. 
83 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 17. 
84 Id. at 19. 
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ultimate loyalty to a Hartian framing and its distinction between law and 
non-law. As Rick puts it in Constituent Authority, he is insistent that, 
“[l]ike it or not, a true constituent authority must act without the comfort of 
legal authorization.”85 He acknowledges that “[i]n certain circumstances, 
[the] masking of an exercise of constituent authority behind a facade of 
legality serves important political interests.”86 Nonetheless, that exercise 
will still necessarily—indeed definitionally—be extra-legal in character. 
This leads him inexorably to his theoretical and methodological 
conclusion: “The absence of a legal answer to the question of who has 
constituent authority obliges us to identify a social and/or political one.”87  
This separation of the legal from the social and political is not merely 
Hartian; it is also driven by Rick’s overarching (dare I say it, “originalist”) 
desire to identify specific starting points for legal and constitutional 
interpretation.88 He insists: “Like every human phenomenon, a legal 
system must have a beginning.”89 Moreover, not only must it have a 
beginning, but society and politics must be antecedent to that beginning 
rather than be intimately bound up with law in co-constitutive fashion.  
Although this approach may make sense from the perspective of a kind 
of originalist legal doctrine, it is much more tenuous from the perspectives 
of history, sociology, or even anthropology (i.e., the disciplines on which a 
more institutionalist approach to law ultimately draws). There may well 
have been a point in the very distant past of human development when 
functional needs first gave rise to social groupings, in turn precipitating the 
advent of an interest-based politics, culminating in cultural conceptions of 
legal “right,” both public and private. But once each of these domains first 
emerged, they began to influence each other in complex and 
multi-directional ways,90 giving rise to the range of social, political, and 
legal institutions that, as Hauriou saw, have provided “the juridical basis of 
society and the state.”91  
Thus, given the extent of this antecedent institutionalization, it is 
difficult to maintain that any modern legal system must have an 
identifiable “beginning” except in anything more than a formal or technical 
sense. As one historical sociologist once rightly observed, “the world is 
always already institutionalized. Change unfolds on historically specific 
                                                                                                                     
85 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 735. 
86 Id. at 733. 
87 Id. at 735. 
88 See, e.g., Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 22, at 31 (in applying a rule of law, one 
must look to the creation of it). 
89 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 735. 
90 See supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text (discussing the “elements of 
institutionalization”). 
91 Hauriou, supra note 8, at 93.  
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terrain . . .”92 (of which, implicitly, conceptions of law and legality will 
always be a part). We cannot escape the inherited institutional and legal 
constructions of that terrain, including in our analysis of politics and 
society. Rather, it is through these constructions—and perhaps more 
importantly, through the cultural process of internalizing their seeming 
normative demands over time (whether explicitly or implicitly)—that we 
claim (hope) to live in a society governed by the “rule of law” rather than 
by the whims of power and force.  
Hauriou is again helpful in spelling out for us the implications of this 
more institutionalist approach. When he spoke of how an “organization of 
fact . . . must obtain pardon for its origin, must modify itself, must put 
itself in harmony with the conscience of jurisprudence,”93 he was in fact 
referring to the inescapability of antecedent legal conceptions in shaping 
the processes of institutionalization and legitimation. For Hauriou, this is 
the role of “law” writ large, to institutionalize, legitimize, and grant such 
an organization a “peaceful existence.”94 This “law” is revealed socially 
and culturally, in the continuing process of historical development 
manifested in the balance of forces that society realizes in itself over time.  
This explains why—beyond the “idea” and the “organized power” in 
service of that idea—Hauriou added the third element in the process of 
institutionalization: “manifestations of communion that occur within the 
social group with respect to the idea and its realization.”95 It is through 
these “manifestations of communion” that a social group takes a kind of 
ownership of an organization of fact (whether created by political force or 
in response to functional demand). This ownership becomes part of the 
group’s identity. It is through this process of internalization and 
identification that a social legitimacy emerges, one that truly allows the 
“real” to be viewed as “right” for that particular community. The forms of 
law play a crucial role here, because, as Hauriou maintains, institutions are 
fundamentally both historical and legal constructions—they are “born, live, 
and die” through acts of foundation, administration, and/or dissolution that 
the community experiences, in a cultural sense, as having a specifically 
legal effect.96 
In this sense, the English revolutionaries of 1688-89 were not, to return 
to Rick’s phrase, really “fak[ing]” it at all.97 Rather, they were engaged in a 
process of reshaping conceptions of “right” in the cultural dimension, a 
                                                                                                                     
92 Elisabeth S. Clemens, Rereading Skowronek: A Precocious Theory of Institutional Change, 27 
SOC. SCI. HIST. 443, 446 (2003).  
93 Hauriou, supra note 10, at 816. 
94 Id. 
95 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
96 Hauriou, supra note 9, as translated in THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS, supra note 8, at 100. 
97 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 17. 
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process that is inherent in the process of “reconciliation.”98 As the cultural 
historian Sarah Hanley once succinctly put it: 
[T]he historical process [is] a renewable dialogue or cultural 
conversation, wherein history is culturally ordered by 
existing concepts, or schemes of meaning, at play in given 
times and places; and culture is historically ordered when 
schemes of meaning are revalued and revised as persons act 
and reenact them over time. One might regard this process of 
reordering as one that “counterfeits culture”; that is, as a 
process that replicates a perceived original but at the same 
time (consciously or unconsciously) forges something quite 
new.99 
The reason something new inevitably emerges out of this process of 
replication is that the process itself is always imperfect. Sometimes actors 
intentionally pursue a “counterfeit” law or politics but usually not; rather 
they are normally engaged in a sincere effort to express a genuine, if 
evolving, legal and political identity in the face of new social and political 
pressures. “Reconciliation” is unavoidable even to the most committed 
originalist. 
The commitment to legal continuity was undoubtedly central to the 
identity of the English revolutionaries of 1688-89, and out of their efforts 
to displace James with William emerged a broadly legitimate regime in the 
eyes of an overwhelmingly Protestant population. Although there remained 
not-insignificant pockets of Jacobite resistance at the periphery,100 the 
revolutionary effort at the core (including the purportedly “fake” legal 
continuity) undoubtedly contributed to building a greatly reinforced 
governing system. With that augmented legitimacy, the new regime would 
dramatically increase its capacity to mobilize fiscal and human resources 
and thus to project power much more expansively, both in Europe and 
indeed throughout the world, over the next century.101 
                                                                                                                     
98 See supra notes 44–46, 70–72 and accompanying text. 
99 Sarah Hanley, Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern 
France, 16 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 4, 5–6 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
100 In Scotland, there would be periodic Jacobite rebellions well into the next century. Moreover, 
in Ireland, following the Williamite War of 1688–91, the Protestant Ascendancy would need to 
maintain, in effect, “an armed peace,” to borrow the pertinent phrasing from Hauriou, the effects of 
which Ireland is still living with today. Hauriou, supra note 10, at 816. 
101 See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of 
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 830 
(1989) (“It is clear that the institutional changes of the Glorious Revolution permitted the drive toward 
British hegemony and dominance of the world.”); but see Steven C. A. Pincus & James A. Robinson, 
What Really Happened During the Glorious Revolution?, in INSTITUTIONS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGACY OF DOUGLASS NORTH 192, 221–22 (Sebastian Galiani & Itai Sened 
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The achievement of the Glorious Revolution stands in contrast with 
some prominent revolutions of the twentieth century that were less 
fastidious in “employ[ing] the rhetoric, if not the reality, of legal 
regularity.”102 The Bolshevik Revolution, which Rick touches on in Legal 
Rhetoric and Revolutionary Change,103 was no doubt able to 
institutionalize itself sufficiently to support a dictatorial regime that would 
last over seventy years. But its ultimate collapse arguably owed as much to 
the cynicism and lack of legitimacy flowing from its rejection of 
“bourgeois legality” (and the many abuses both large and small that this 
engendered) as from the regime’s inability to meet the material needs of its 
population.  
A second twentieth-century revolution would be the Nazi seizure of 
power in Germany in 1933, followed by its utterly failed effort to establish 
a “Thousand-Year Reich,” lasting a mere twelve years. Carl Schmitt, who 
joined the Nazi Party after the seizure in 1933, famously attempted to dress 
up the violence of the Nazi state with a patina of legality.104 But leaving 
aside its colossal criminality and brutality, “the Hitler regime,” as one of its 
foremost historians has noted, would prove to be “inimical to a rational 
order of government and administration. Its hallmark was systemlessness, 
administrative and governmental disorder, the erosion of clear patterns of 
government, however despotic.”105 
In 1944, surrounded by the evidence of the resulting catastrophe for 
Europe and the world, Schmitt offered a set of reflections on the “plight” 
of European jurisprudence.106 Taking refuge, in part, in French legal 
doctrine (notably that of Hauriou),107 he wrote of the necessity for “a sense 
for the logic and consistency of concepts and institutions,” a “minimum of 
an orderly procedure, due process, without which there can be no law,” as 
well as “a recognition of the individual based on mutual respect.”108 
Although Schmitt had long claimed inspiration from Hauriou’s 
                                                                                                                     
eds., 2014) (critiquing the North and Weingast interpretation). More generally, see JOHN BREWER, THE 
SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1783 (1988). 
102 KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 19. 
103 See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, Der Führer schützt das Recht (The Leader Protects the Law), 39 
DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 945 (1934). 
105 IAN KERSHAW, ‘Working towards the Führer’: Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler 
Dictatorship, in HITLER, THE GERMANS, AND THE FINAL SOLUTION 29, 35 (2008). 
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institutional theory,109 his Nazi episode showed how he shared none of the 
French professor’s commitment to constitutionalism grounded in 
separation of powers or the protection of individual rights.110 Schmitt even 
had the audacity to argue that it was now necessary to “defend this 
indestructible core of all law against all destructive enactments,” a task 
“which today in Europe is more critical than at any other time and in any 
other part of the world.”111 One can only laugh even if otherwise 
overwhelmed by disgust by Schmitt’s self-serving cynicism. 
Rather than be taken in by that cynicism, however, we can instead see 
it as “the tribute that vice customarily pays to virtue,” to borrow roughly 
contemporaneous phrasing from an American historian.112 One hopes that 
there is indeed such an “indestructible core of law,” whose continuity 
should be defended and preserved during all upheavals, revolutionary or 
otherwise. As Rick so ably describes, the English revolutionaries of 
1688-89 felt a “pull of legality” and “shame of illegality” that “were 
continuous, insistent, and intense.”113 Thank goodness they felt the 
necessity to “fak[e] it” in this way,114 because it set a good example for 
future revolutions to emulate, even if many have not, with disastrous 
consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
I can only close by thanking Rick again for the richness and 
sophistication of his work, and in particular for GRCL and Constituent 
Authority, the two pieces on which I focus here. Not only has Rick been, as 
I noted at the outset of this Essay, a model of academic citizenship and a 
source of wise counsel over many decades, he has also been a model of a 
scholarly life well lived. My only regret is that our different “epistemic 
communities”115 have kept us from engaging with each other’s work in 
greater depth over our two decades on the faculty together. My hope is that 
this Essay can be the start of many more fruitful exchanges in the years to 
come. I am greatly looking forward to them. 
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